Silane Gas Explosion at Osaka University [October 2, 1991; School of Engineering Science, Osaka University]

Masayuki Nakao

Institution of Engineering Innovation and Engineering Research Institute Department, Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo

An explosion occurred at the School of Engineering Science, Osaka University, during a student experiment with a CVD (Chemical Vapor Deposition) system. The Silane container (Figure 1), which supplied gas to the CVD system, blew up. Two students were killed and five others received minor injuries. The accident was caused by a reverse flow of Nitrous Oxide due to a degraded O-ring seal used in a check valve (Figure 2), and the mixture of Silane and Nitrous Oxide exploded in the container . The explosion ignited the city gas and organochlorine solvent in the facility and started a fire.




Figure 1: Piping outline around the containers for CVD system (estimation) [3]




Figure 2: Check valve [3]

1. Event

During student experiments at the School of E ngineering Science, Osak a University with a plasma CVD system , a Silane container that supplied gas to the CVD system suddenly exploded. Two students were killed and five others received m inor injuries by the blast and flying debris from the explosion.

2. Course

Around 4pm on October 2, 1991, at the School of E ngineering Science, Osaka Uni versity, a student closed a valve (DV1 in Figure 1) of a plasm a CVD system. The closure triggered a sudden explosion in the Silane container that supplied gas to the CV D system. The Silane container bursted, and the blast forced everything including the test equipment and people to the walls. The explosion and flying debris from it killed two students and injured five others. The explosion also ignited the city gas and organochlorine solvents to start a fire.

3. Cause (Refer to the piping layout of gas supply facilities in Figure 3)

What exploded in the Silane cont ainer was m ixed gas of Silane (SiH $_4$) and Ni trous Oxi de (N₂O). The O-ring within check valve (CV₃) in Figure 2 had been degraded by Nitrous Oxide, and the check valve (i.e., non-return valve) had lost its function. As a result, a reverse flow of Nitrous Oxide through the check valve (CV₃) flew into the Silane container via the purge lines. The purge lines rem ove noxious fum es and com bustible gas inside the pipes by introducing inert gas such as Nitrogen after each system operation. When the student closed the valve (DV₁) the m ixed gas in pur ge lines com pressed, generated heat and ign ited. The flam e then traveled back to the container through the pip ing and explo ded the container. The pressure inside the container at the tim e of e xplosion was estim ated at 2,000 to 3,000kgf/cm². The safety valves for preventing heat meltdown of the container had no time to activate.




Figure 3: Piping layout of gas supply facility [2]

4. Immediate Action

Two m onths after the incident, High-pressure Gas Control Law was revised to m andate reporting the use of spe cific high-pressure gas su ch as Silane, regardless of the a mount. The revision was posted to jurisdic tional prefecture a nd city governm ents. Each university voluntarily started inspecting applicable gas lines.

5. Countermeasure

- (1) To prevent the O-ring d egradation by Nitrous Oxide, the ch eck valve (CV₃) and the ball valve (BV₃) were r elocated. The or iginal location of the check valve close to a gas cylinder kept the O-ring exposed to N itrous Oxide. The pressure of Nitrous Oxide (typically 50 atmospheres) is higher than the p ressure of Nitrogen (usually a few atmospheres). A new ball valve with m etal contact was placed next to the gas cylinder.
- (2) Separate purge lines were placed for each ga s type. Shared pipes have advantage in easy operation and lower system cost, how ever, could generate dangerous gas mixture like in this case.

6. Summary

Due to the degradation of an O-ring in a check valve, Nitrous Oxide flew into Silane through purge lines and caused the explosion. When designing systems with potential hazards like this case, it is n ecessary to m ake sure that all the safety features such as check valves function properly at all time. It is also important to periodically inspect such safeguards components. Furthermore, it is essential to desig n inherent s afety into such system s like separ ate purge lines. At the time of the accident the industry rum ored the university's loose m anagement being the root cause. Shared purge lines, however, were also used in some industry systems.

7. Knowledge

- (1) Silane gas is dangerou s. It can explode when its den sity exceeds 1%, and is flammable when mixed with Nitrous Oxide. The mixture usually does not explode at room temperature, but if it is ignited the power of explosion is large.
- (2) Degradation of material may lead to an accident. Systems should use material that is hard to degrade in the planned environm ent, or otherwise, they should be designed with inherent safety to prevent damage even when the material degrades.
- (3) Efforts to improve working property or reduce cost can reduce the margin of safety.
- (4) If fatal accidents are possible, designing inhe rent safety into system s is ab solutely essential. The original layout in Figure 1 is dangerous, for example, if an earthquake happens during an experim ent, piping can ge t slacked to mix gases, an d any spark can readily cause an explosion like this case.
- (5) Gas-leak sensors are not versatile. It appears that they thought the system was safe enough with the gas-leak sensor (indicated in the center of Figure 1).

8. Background

Technopolis Initiativ e (Law for Acceler ating Regional Develop ment Based upon High-Technology Industrial Complexes: Con cept to develop industrial tow ns, which organically bound academic research functions and living functions, in order to introduce and develop high-tech industry to local regions) driv en by the Ministry of International T rade and Industry (now the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) went into effect in March 1983. The initiative triggered rapid introduction of foreign technology with foci on sem iconductor technology and m echatronics. The sem iconductor technology involves various chem ical materials including Silane. Many accidents were caused by the spontaneous combustibility of Silane; a fire of a sem iconductor factory in Kiyotake-cho, Miyazaki, caused by Silane gas leakage in October 1983, Silane gas explosion at a sem iconductor prototyping facility in Kodaira, Tokyo, in Decem ber 1989, a fire caused by Silan e at a sem iconductor factory of Miyazaki Oki Electric in Takasaki, Gunma, in March 1990, a fire caused by Silane leak age at a Silane manufacturing plant in Aomi, Niigata, in June 1990.

< References >

- [1] Contamination issues caused by chem ical material, Hokkaido University inform ation initiative Center. http://www.hucc.hokudai.ac.jp/
- [2] Machinery Creativity, Y otaro Hatam ura, Koz o Ono, Masayuki Nakao (Editors), Maruzen Co., Ltd.
- [3] The Practice of Machine Design Book 3, Lear ning from Failure, Yotaro Hatamura ed., Practice of Machine Design Research Group, The Nikken Kogyo Shimbun, Ltd.
- [4] High-pressure Gas V ol.29 No.251 (1992), Os aka University Silane Gas Explosion Accident Investigative Committee Interim Report

[On the Side]

Article 23 of the Constitution guarantees the fr eedom of learning as "Academic freedom shall be guaranteed." Some understand this constitution not only guarantees the acad emic freedom but also guarantees autonom y in universities. However, people should f ully understand that university laboratories ar e not extraterrito rial and should take every possible measure to ensure their safety.